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Abstract 
We use mixed-complementarity-problem programming to implement tariff rate 
quotas (TRQs) in the global computable general equilibrium (CGE) LINKAGE model. We 
apply the approach to TRQs in sugar markets in OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) countries. We calibrate the model on 2000 policy levels 
for OECD countries to reflect the full implementation of their World Trade Organization 
commitments. We look at reforms of TRQ and TRQ-like schemes in the European 
Union, the United States, and Japan, as well as multilateral trade liberalization. We derive 
the impact of reforms on welfare, bilateral trade flows, and terms of trade. A 33 percent 
multilateral decrease of ad valorem tariffs, combined with a 33 percent increase in 
imports under TRQ-like schemes in the European Union, the United States, and Japan, 
induces a global welfare gain of about $889 million. These three countries’ trade policies 
create substantial trade diversion, which excludes many low-cost producers from trading 
opportunities. An expansion of their import quotas alone, without multilateral trade 
liberalization, induces welfare gains but preserves most of the trade diversion patterns. 
The latter diversion benefits some least-developed countries’ producers because of 
granted bilateral TRQ allocations. In the context of greater market access, reductions in 
tariffs in the European Union and the United States, and in border “surcharges” in Japan, 
will have to be dramatic before they can affect trade flows significantly as compared to 
TRQ expansion. Full multilateral trade liberalization induces global welfare gains of 
about $3 billion. 
 
Keywords: CGE model, Doha, liberalization, sugar, tariff rate quota, trade negotiations, 
TRQ.  
  
 
 
 
MODELING TARIFF RATE QUOTAS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: 
THE CASE OF SUGAR MARKETS IN OECD COUNTRIES 
Introduction 
We use a mixed-complementarity-problem (MCP) programming approach (Ruther-
ford 2001; van der Mensbrugghe 2003b) to fully implement tariff rate quotas (TRQs) in 
the global computable general equilibrium (CGE) LINKAGE model (van der Mensbrugghe 
2003a). Previous attempts to model TRQs in multi-country models typically have used 
linearized inequalities to implement TRQ reforms (e.g., Bach and Pearson 1996; Elbehri 
et al. 2000; and Elbehri and Pearson 2000). Modeling TRQs remains a difficult task 
because of the discontinuous regime switching inherent in TRQ regimes. Further, ac-
counting for TRQ rents requires additional model modifications to keep balanced flows 
in the global social accounting matrix.  
We apply the methodology to TRQs in protected OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) sugar markets. Sugar prices in the European Union, 
Japan, and the United States are more than double those in the world market because of 
high protection to domestic producers relying on trade barriers. Such protection has 
distorted internationally traded sugar and in the process has deprived lower-cost develop-
ing country exporters of growth opportunities. Hence, the sugar application is policy 
relevant in the double context of agricultural reform and the “development round” of the 
current negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO). We calibrate the model on 
2000 trade policy levels for OECD countries to reflect the full implementation of com-
mitments under the Uruguay Round of the WTO. We consider several reform scenarios: 
OECD import quota expansion, a decrease in OECD out-of-quota tariffs, their combina-
tion, and multilateral liberalization. The analysis derives the impact of reforms on 
production, trade flows, quota rents, prices, and welfare. 
The LINKAGE model is a global, multi-region, multi-sector, dynamic applied general 
equilibrium model. It is currently implemented in GAMS, and its specification is virtually 
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free of references to specific dimensions (region, sector, or time). The model is accompa-
nied by an aggregation facility, which is used to aggregate the extensive GTAP (Global 
Trade Analysis Project) dataset into a tractable dataset for simulation purposes. The 
output of the aggregation facility is the primary input for the model. The aggregation 
facility also produces some auxiliary data, such as population, and the model user is 
expected to provide values for all key elasticities. The dynamic version of the model also 
requires a series of assumptions, which are to be provided independently of the aggrega-
tion facility. The model is described in detail in van der Mensbrugghe 2003a. The results 
presented here are generated by a comparative-static version of the LINKAGE model, with 
the world divided into 16 countries/regions. The model incorporates 22 sectors, including 
a combined raw and refined sugar sector. 
We find that a 33 percent multilateral decrease of ad valorem tariffs, combined with 
a 33 percent increase in imports under TRQ-like schemes in the European Union, the 
United States, and Japan, induces a global welfare gain of about $889 million. These 
three countries’ trade policies create substantial trade diversion, which excludes many 
low-cost producers from trading opportunities. An expansion of their import quotas 
alone, without multilateral trade liberalization, induces welfare gains but preserves most 
of the trade diversion patterns. The latter diversion benefits some least-developed coun-
tries’ (LDCs) producers, because of granted bilateral TRQ allocations. In the context of 
greater market access, reductions in tariffs in the European Union and the United States, 
and in border “surcharges” in Japan, will have to be dramatic before they can affect trade 
flows significantly as compared to TRQ expansion. Full multilateral trade liberalization 
induces global welfare gains of about $3 billion. 
In the following section, we describe the essence of the implementation of TRQs in 
the model. We then describe the salient features of trade policies in the three OECD 
countries. The fourth and fifth sections spell out important simplifying assumptions 
underlying the analysis and the policy reform scenarios considered. The results are given 
next, and then the paper concludes with some policy implications for the current WTO 
negotiations.  
The contribution of our paper to the literature is twofold. First, there is the imple-
mentation of TRQs in CGE modeling using MCP programming. This is a methodological 
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contribution. Second, we parameterize Japan’s sugar policy, a complex system of tariffs, 
surcharges, and import targets implemented by parastatals acting as state-trading agen-
cies. This new policy information and parameterization are then incorporated in a 
quantitative analysis of sugar policy reforms in OECD countries and in a multilateral 
setting. This is an empirical contribution to the long-standing debate on sugar policy. 
 
Modeling Tariff Rate Quotas 
TRQs, an old policy instrument, were used in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Ag-
riculture (URAA) to permit minimum market access and at the same time convert a wide 
range of agricultural non-tariff barriers into tariffs (so-called tariffication) (Skully 1999). 
Under a TRQ, some level of imports is allowed at a relatively low or zero tariff rate, but 
any imported quantity above the quota is taxed at a higher or prohibitive rate. Let XMq 
represent the quota and XM the level of imports. If XM is less than XMq, i.e., the level of 
imports is less than the quota level, the domestic price of imports is equal to the border 
price, PWM, times 1 plus the in-quota tariff rate, m_i. If the level of imports is equal to 
the quota, i.e., the quota is binding, the domestic import price is equal to the border price 
times 1 plus the in-quota tariff rate plus a premium, m_p. Should import demand exceed 
the quota, the out-of-quota tariff rate, m_o, will be applied to all out-of-quota imports and 
the domestic price will equal the border price times 1 plus the out-of-quota tariff rate. 
In a simple one-sector static case, this can be formulated using the following equa-
tions (the multi-country extension is presented in Appendix A). Equations (1) and (2) 
define respectively the price of exports and imports, PE and PM. The former is simply 
the world price, WPE, times the exchange rate, ER. The latter is also equal to the world 
price, WPM, times the exchange rate, adjusted for the appropriate tariff schedule. If 
imports are within quota, the appropriate tariff rate is simply the in-quota tariff rate, m_i, 
and the premium will be zero. If imports are at quota or above, the appropriate tariff rate 
is the in-quota tariff rate plus a premium. While demand is constrained to the quota level, 
the import premium will be endogenous. If demand is above the quota level, the appro-
priate tariff rate is m_o, i.e., the out-of-quota tariff. The equation holds in this case 
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because the premium is equal to the difference between the out-of-quota tariff and the 
within-quota tariff. 
 WPEERPE . , and  (1) 
  pmimWPMERPM __1.   . (2) 
Income, YH, in this simple model is equal to the value of production, XP, plus tariff 
revenues and a share, , of the quota rents, TRQY, as shown in equation (3). Consump-
tion, XA, is equal to income divided by the price of consumption, PA, as shown in 
equation (4). Armington demand, XA, equated with consumption, is split into two com-
ponents assuming that domestic and import goods are imperfect substitutes. Equations (5) 
and (6) determine respectively demand for the domestic good, XD, and import demand, 
XM. The elasticity of substitution is given by . The Armington price, PA, is derived 
from the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) dual price formula, equation (7), where 
PD is the price of the domestic good and PM, previously derived, is the price of imported 
goods. 
 TRQYXMWPMERXMWPMERXPPPYH oomiim ........ __   , (3) 
 PAYHXA / , (4) 
 XA
PD
PAXD d
 
 
	




 , (5) 
 XA
PM
PAXM m
 
 
	




 , and (6) 
              1/111 PMPDPA md . (7) 
Analogous to the Armington assumption, output is allocated between the domestic 
and export market using a transformation function where the constant elasticity of 
transformation (CET) is given by . Equation (8) determines the producer price, PP. It is 
essentially an equilibrium condition where the CET dual price formula replaces the CET 
primal aggregation function. Equations (9) and (10) determine respectively the supply 
functions for the domestic market, XD, and the export market, XE. Note that the XD 
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variable is the same in both equations (5) and (9) and in fact that the supply equals 
demand equilibrium condition is subsumed in these two equations: 
              1/111 PEPDPP ed , (8)  
 XP
PP
PDXD d
 
 
	




 , and (9)  
 XP
PP
PEXE e
 
 
	




 . (10)  
Constraint (11) determines the level of the in-quota imports. The constraint repre-
sents the orthogonality constraint for the in-quota import level, i.e.,   0_  pmiq XMXM  . 
This condition holds if the premium is zero, in which case the in-quota import level is 
less than the quota, or if the in-quota import level equals the quota and the premium is 
positive. Similarly, constraint (12), determining the premium level, also represents an 
orthogonality constraint for the premium. If the level of imports exceeds the quota, i.e., 
the out-of-quota level of imports is positive, then the premium is strictly equal to the 
difference between the out-of-quota and within-quota rates. If the out-of-quota level of 
imports is zero, then the premium is endogenous and lower than the difference in the two 
rates. Equation (13) determines the level of the out-of-quota imports by residual. Equa-
tion (14) describes the value of the quota rents. There are three situations. If the quota is 
not binding, the premium rate is zero and the rents are zero. If the quota is binding but 
imports are equal to the quota, the premium is endogenous and the rents are simply equal 
to the quota level times the premium rate. The third situation is when imports exceed the 
quota. In this case, the premium is equal to the difference in the two rates, i.e., the holders 
of the quotas can import at the lower within-quota rate but sell at the higher out-of-quota 
rate and therefore pocket the revenues generated by the difference. These four equations 
are as follows: 
 
qi XMXM   with 0_ pm , (11)  
 
ompmim ___    with 0oXM , (12)  
 
oi XMXMXM  , and (13)  
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qpm XMWPMERTRQY _..  . (14)  
Next,	
 	
	

unchanged and first assuming that the quota is binding but no out-of-quota imports occur. 
In this case there are two calibration choices. One could assume knowledge of the 
premium and the rent share parameter is calibrated, or vice versa. In any case, the model 
assumes that all quota rents accrue to the government. In a single household model, this 
will have no in-country welfare implications since, under the standard closure rule, 
changes to the government fiscal position are financed through lump-sum taxes. In the 
base year, the following knowledge is given: (i) trade at world prices inclusive of the 
premium rents transferred to the exporter, R, (ii) import tariff collections inclusive of the 
premium rents captured by the importer, Y, and (iii) the in-quota tariff rate, m_i. 
The following two identities must hold in any case: 
 
( ) W-1WR p_m+= , and (15)  
 WWY p_mi_m += , (16)  
where W is the value of imports at world prices exclusive of the import tariff and pre-
mium, and m_p is the premium rate. Equation (15) states that the observed value of 
imports at world prices is equal to the value of trade exclusive of the tariff premium 
income plus the share of the quota rents captured by the exporter. Equation (16) reflects 
the value of government revenues. It is equal to the revenues generated by the in-quota 
imports plus the importer’s share of the quota rents. This is a system of two equations in 
two unknowns, leading to the following solution: 
( )Y-1R
R-Y ip_m
-
= ,  and  
( )
( ) i_m
-1
Y-1R
W
-
-
= . 
In the alternative, the premium, p, is known and the distribution share, , is unknown. 
The same two initial equations can be solved for  and W: 
( )
( )RY
RY1
p_m
i_mp_m
+
-+
= , and p_mi_m1
RY
W
++
+
= . 
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If over-quota imports occur, the in- and over-quota tariffs need to be specified. The 
premium will be simply the difference in the two tariff rates. The quota needs to be 
specified. From this information, one can deduce the share of the quota rent revenues 
accruing to the importing country. Appendix A extends this basic framework to a global 
model with TRQs assigned to bilateral flows. Van der Mensbrugghe (2003b) provides the 
GAMS code to implement the TRQs. 
 
Sugar Trade Policies in the EU-15, Japan, and the United States 
The policy description focuses on trade distortions in the European Union, the 
United States, and Japan affecting sugar imports by these countries. The policies in the 
three countries are based on TRQs (European Union, United States) or TRQ-like 
scheme (Japan). Mitchell (2003) provides a detailed description of all trade and domes-
tic sugar policies for major players in world markets. When relevant to the analysis, the 
note mentions features of domestic programs or export market distortions that interact 
with the TRQs. 
 
E.U. Tariff Rate Quota Policy 
TRQs are the cornerstone of E.U. sugar protection, along with production subsidies 
and supply controls (so-called quota A and B sugar), and export subsidies (Mitchell 
2003). The E.U. TRQ scheme sets bilateral import quotas. Preferential access at guaran-
teed high price serves as “development assistance” to 46 countries from Africa, the 
Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) originally secured under the 1975 Lomé Convention. 
The Sugar Protocol (SP) of the Lomé Convention specified original quotas for 1.295 
million tons of white sugar equivalent, and an additional 10,000 tons for India. An 
additional import allocation was made of between 200,000 and 350,000 tons of sugar 
primarily to ACP countries in 1995, under “Special Preference Sugar” (SPS). This 
allocation was not permanent: the quantity could vary based on import needs, and the 
price paid for SPS sugar was 85 percent of the SP guaranteed price. The European Union 
accepted the WTO import commitments of the new E.U. members joining in 1995, 
including a tariff quota of 42,000 tons from Brazil, with a within-quota tariff rate of ECU 
98 per ton (49 percent ad valorem equivalent in 2000). Several countries in the Balkans 
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have temporary access to the E.U. market, and imports under this program totaled about 
100,000 tons in 2001/02. In total, the E.U. permanent commitment is 1.39 million tons 
(white sugar equivalent) plus additional quantities of up to 450,000 tons of temporary 
imports. All out-of-quota imports face a specific tariff of EUR 346 or 174 percent in ad 
valorem equivalent in 2000. The model uses these ad valorem tariff values. 
These E.U. import commitments were expanded by the Everything But Arms initia-
tive (EBA) in 2001.  The EBA initiative allows duty-free access to the E.U. sugar market 
to the 48 LDCs (39 ACP countries). Initially, EBA imports enter duty-free but are limited 
by quotas and counted against the SPS quota (a zero sum effect on imports but with 
distribution effects among exporters). The EBA quota will increase annually until full 
duty-free access for white and raw sugar is allowed in 2009.  
Virtually all preferential sugar imports are re-exported with a unit export subsidy 
corresponding to the difference between the preferential import price and the prevailing 
world price. The European Union has WTO commitments on subsidized exports, both in 
terms of maximum subsidized volume and total subsidy outlays. The export volume 
commitment covers the re-exported preferential imports and E.U. sugar production under 
the so-called quota A and B. The latter is too costly to be competitive on the world 
market. An increase in E.U. preferential imports (i.e., an increase in the TRQ quota) 
would then induce a direct offset of this subsidized domestic production under quotas A 
and B to meet the WTO commitment limiting export volume. Following this increase in 
preferential imports (increased TRQ quota), the E.U. aggregate supply of unsubsidized 
sugar (so-called C sugar) should increase moderately. The latter occurs because some but 
not all E.U. producers can compete at world price levels and replace the lost quota sugar 
by producing and exporting C sugar (Frandsen et al. 2001). Hence, aggregate domestic 
supply in the European Union should decrease as a result of increasing preferential 
imports but by a lesser amount than the TRQ quota increase. 
Japanese Import Policy 
The Agriculture and Livestock Industries Corporation (ALIC) acts as a state-trading 
agency in the Japanese sugar market, with a monopsony on imported raw sugar purchases 
and a monopoly on the domestic resale of these raw sugar imports. The Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) determines an annual import volume target, 
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usually around 1.5 million metric tons (Dyck 2003). MAFF determines the Japanese price 
of raw sugar, imposing a hefty surcharge over the world price of raw sugar (about 84 
percent in ad valorem equivalent in 2000 [Fukuda, Dyck, and Stout 2001; Dyck 2003]). If 
imports exceed the target level, a second surcharge is imposed on above-target imports, 
bringing the total out-of-target surcharge to 155 percent ad valorem equivalent. This 
secondary surcharge is applied if a processing firm goes over its firm-level targeted 
imports. However, if all firms exceeded their targets, they would all be paying the 
secondary surcharge. De facto, ALIC-MAFF’s trade policy for raw sugar mimics a TRQ 
scheme. The official tariff on raw sugar imports is zero. Refined sugar imports are 
effectively barred by prohibitive tariffs (about $623/metric ton). These policy instrument 
levels for Japan are not reported to the WTO since officially they are not tariffs and their 
levels are approximate because of unavailable data (Dyck 2003).  
U.S. Tariff Rate Quota Policy  
In the URAA, the United States agreed to maintain minimum imports of 1.139 mil-
lion metric tons of raw value sugar imports (including 22,000 metric tons of refined 
sugar). The raw sugar TRQ was allocated to 40 quota-holding countries based on their 
historical export shares during the 1975-81 period when trade was relatively unrestricted. 
The duty of 0.625¢/lb, raw value, continues on quota imports. Most countries continue to 
avoid the duty because of General System of Preference or Caribbean Basin Initiative 
programs. The duty on raw sugar above the tariff-rate quota was 17.62¢/lb beginning in 
January 1995 and lowered by 0.45¢/lb each year until it reached 15.36¢/lb in 2000 (190 
percent in ad valorem equivalent). The refined sugar above-rate tariff was 18.62¢/lb in 
1995 and declined by 0.48¢ per year through 2000 to reach 16.21¢/lb. The over-quota 
tariff remains prohibitive even with a world price of about 5¢/lb (assuming a raw sugar 
market price of 22¢/lb and a transportation price of 1.5¢/lb).  
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) became effective on January 
1, 1994, and most trade barriers between Canada, Mexico, and the United States are in 
the process of being eliminated over the subsequent 15 years. The NAFTA sugar provi-
sions were altered by a side-letter agreement prior to the start of the NAFTA Agreement. 
According to the NAFTA side-letter, Mexico’s low-tier tariff sugar exports to the United 
States are restricted by Mexico’s “net surplus production” of sugar. The net surplus is 
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defined as Mexico’s production of sugar less its consumption of sugar and high fructose 
corn syrup. From FY 2001 through FY 2007, Mexico is to have duty-free access to the 
U.S. market for the amount of its surplus, up to a maximum of 250,000 metric tons raw 
value. Beginning in FY 2008, Mexico will have duty-free access with no quantitative 
limit. The high-tier tariff schedule for raw and refined sugar has been declining by an 
equal annual amount, from 10.58¢ and 11.21¢/lb to zero, respectively, over the transition 
period to duty-free access in 2008. Out-of-quota imports from Mexico have been occur-
ring since 1998-99. The model is calibrated to reflect the out-of-quota imports from 
Mexico induced by the lower out-of-quota tariff faced by Mexican sugar exports to the 
U.S. market. The tariff is set at the 2000 level (ad valorem equivalent to 133 percent). 
 
Additional Assumptions 
A set of simplifying assumptions pertains to domestic policy programs. The GTAP 
5.3 database reports production subsidies, input subsidies, and direct payments to capital 
and land but does not account for supply control such as sugar marketing allotments in 
the United States or production quotas in the European Union. Given the focus on import 
policies, the domestic sugar distortions are kept as described in the GTAP 5.3 database.  
Another difficulty arises with export subsidies and E.U. export subsidy commitments 
under the URAA. Whenever the European Union increases its preferential imports, it has 
to decrease its subsidized production (quotas A and B) by roughly the same volume to 
meet subsidized export volume commitments. Subsidized production equivalent to the 
increased preferential imports could not be exported without subsidy. The current analy-
sis does not address this important aspect of the E.U. policy.  
The sectoral definition of sugar crops and sugar in the GTAP 5.3 database is hetero-
geneous across countries. The sugar-crop sector includes raw cane sugar in some 
countries and, as a result, shows some trade flows for these nontraded crops. Further, the 
sugar sector includes refined sugar in some countries and both raw and refined sugar in 
others. To avoid this inconsistency, we aggregate the sugar crop and sugar sector in an 
aggregate sugar sector. Besides sugar, the sectoral disaggregation is similar to that of van 
der Mensbrugghe (2003a). 
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ers and exporters, which is parameterized in the model. In the European Union and the 
United States, the sharing is 75 percent to importers and 25 percent to exporters, except 
for Mexican imports going to the United States, for which the sharing is 50 percent. In 
Japan, 100 percent of the rents go to importers. This parameter is important in the analy-
sis because it influences the incentive to export and the inter-country welfare implications 
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explained in the model section since it is found by solving a set of equations such as (15)-
(16) for each country, or, if exogenously determined, it has to be consistent with bounds 
put on m_p (0"m_p "m_o-m_i).   
 
Scenarios 
For each country, the analysis considers three types of market access reform scenar-
ios: (i) a 33 percent increase in E.U. and U.S. TRQs, and in the Japanese import target 
(we call these scenarios EUQTA, USQTA, and JPQTA, respectively); (ii) a 33 percent 
decrease in out-of-quota tariffs (out-of-target surcharge in Japan), referred to as (EUTAR, 
USTAR, JPTAR scenarios); (iii) a scenario combining reforms described in (i) and (ii) 
(EULIB, USLIB, JPLIB scenarios). Then, a “QUAD” market access scenario is run, 
combining the three countries’ reforms (QDQTA, QDTAR, QDLIB scenarios).1  The last 
two scenarios look at multilateral reforms. First, we combine a 33 percent multilateral 
tariff reduction in all countries along with the QUAD TRQ reform (MLTLT scenario). 
The last scenario is a full liberalization scenario with all tariffs set to zero (FLLB).  
The scenarios are shown in Table 1, with the value of the policy parameters implied 
by each reform starting from the baseline. Bold characters indicate the changing parame-
ter values. A caveat on the TRQ scenarios is that the state of the world regarding import 
flows in the baseline determines to a large extent which exporting countries will benefit 
from the expansion of the aggregate TRQ in the importing country. Our modeling ap-
proach does not allow for least-cost producers entering a market if they did not already 
export to that market prior to the TRQ expansion. Hence, we are simulating the deleteri-
ous impact of an expansion of the existing TRQ systems and their trade preferences, 
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rather than a genuine increase in market access open to all potential exporters. The latter 
is the essence of the multilateral trade reform scenarios.  
 
Results 
Results are presented in Tables 2-7. The tariff reforms in each individual country 
have a moderate effect on production (Table 3), trade flows (Table 2 and 4), quota rents 
(Table 2), welfare (Tables 5 and 6), and prices (Table 7). By contrast, the quota reforms 
induce much larger changes in the variables. Results of individual country’s reforms are 
nearly additive in two directions. First, for each country, the effects on major variables of 
the combined quota expansion and tariff reduction (EULIB, USLIB, and JPLIB scenar-
ios) are the sum of the effect of each individual instrument reform (EUQTA and EUTAR, 
USQTA and USTAR, JPQTA and JPTAR). Second, The QUAD scenarios (e.g., 
QUDQTA) are also nearly additive in the effects of the corresponding reform in each 
country (the sum of EUQTA, USQTA, and JPQTA effects).  
In the combined reforms (tariff reduction along with quota expansion), the quota ex-
pansion is the binding policy instrument for the European Union, Japan, and the United 
States, noting the NAFTA exception (out-of-quota imports from Mexico to the United 
States). A policy implication is that out-of-quota tariff cuts for sugar should be much 
more substantial than what we have modeled in order to become effective in a TRQ 
reform combining tariff reductions and quota expansion. Table 2 shows the average unit 
rent premium remaining with each reform. The dispersion among exporters is very 
limited except for Brazilian exports to the European Union receiving lower rents. The 
out-of-quota tariffs should fall below the rent value shown in Table 2 to have an effect on 
trade flows. 
In the scenarios involving tariff reductions alone, limited out-of-quota imports occur 
in Japan, originating from Thailand, Australia-New Zealand, the Rest of Latin and 
Central America, and the Rest of Asia in decreasing order. In the same scenarios, out-of-
quota imports to the European Union come from the Rest of sub-Saharan Africa, the Rest 
of Latin and Central America, the Rest of Asia, SACU, India, East and Central Europe 
(ECE), and MENA countries in decreasing order. What is striking is the diversity of 
patterns of export expansion opportunities corresponding to tariff liberalization in each of 
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the three liberalizing countries. Finally, in the United States, Mexican sugar exports are 
the only out-of-quota import expansion resulting from the lower tariffs.  
As shown in Table 3, production expands moderately with the reforms induced in the 
three OECD countries. Hence, a 33 percent tariff cut or a 33 percent quota expansion 
would not induce great changes in production flows or income-generating opportunities 
for sugar exporters. The multilateral scenarios column (last column of Table 3) shows the 
varying fortune of sugar exporters in different policy regimes. A more integrated world 
market as implied by the last scenarios induces production and trade expansion by the 
least-cost producers (Brazil, Thailand, Australia-New Zealand, and the Rest of Latin and 
Central America). However, output contraction is induced in countries favored by the 
E.U. and U.S. TRQ systems that are not truly competitive without preferential trade. The 
contrast between the QLIB column and the last two columns in Table 3 vividly makes 
this point on misallocation of resources induced by current preferential trade agreements. 
ECE and MENA countries cannot produce competitively, and they see their output 
contract under multilateral tariff reductions as compared to the baseline situation. 
The rest of sub-Saharan Africa sees its production expansion fall, moving from the 
QUAD liberalization to the partial multilateral liberalization (MLTLT) but eventually 
picking up again as prices rise with full liberalization (FLLB) (last three columns of 
Table 3). Export patterns reflect production patterns with a considerable expansion of 
exports for low-cost producers under the MLTLT and FLLB scenario relative to the other 
scenarios. The exception is the Rest of Central and Latin America, which fares well under 
both the QUAD liberalization (QUDLIB) and the multilateral reforms (MLTLT and 
FLLB) as shown in the last three columns of Table 4.  
The welfare effects of the reforms are first measured using changes in real gross do-
mestic product (GDP) at base-market prices relative to real GDP in the baseline. These 
are shown in Table 5. These effects are modest by design since the shocks are incre-
mental, resulting in moderate effects on trade and resource allocation. Full multilateral 
trade liberalization scenarios (last column of Table 5) would induce about $1.6 billion of 
additional real GDP, with the largest gains going to the liberalizing countries, ECE, and 
Brazil. The reforming countries gain by reducing inefficiencies in both consumption and 
production. 
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The gains in the QUAD countries under full liberalization are larger than those ob-
tained under the narrower QUAD reforms because of the lower tariffs achieved in the 
former. However, partial liberalization (MLTLT) induces a higher sugar import unit cost 
than do the QUAD reforms, and the welfare gains under MLTLT are lower relative to 
those under the QUAD reforms—a trade-off between lower tariffs and a higher import 
unit cost before tariffs. The European Union appears to gain more from its reforms than 
do the United States and Japan, which is consistent with the respective size of their TRQ 
imports. The European Union has the largest quota.  
In Table 6, we provide equivalent variation (EV) to the policy changes (the difference 
in expenditures at base prices to reach the new and old utility levels). Aggregate results are 
larger ($2.95 billion of aggregate welfare gains). However, the gains for the United States 
and the European Union appear smaller when measured by EV relative to the real GDP 
measure. This result is caused by negative feedback effects of the reforms on nominal 
income and prices in the sugar, food, and service sectors via the balance-of-trade constraint. 
The United States sees factor income increase (an appreciation) because of the stronger 
demand for its manufacturing good exports—Brazil and other exporters increase their 
imports of manufacturing goods. The United States has a large service sector, which can 
absorb higher factor prices and the resulting increase in service price because the sector has 
a large nontraded component. The net effect of a lower sugar price, and higher manufactur-
ing and service prices is barely positive for the United States in the partial multilateral 
liberalization and slightly negative for the full liberalization scenario. The combination of 
these offsetting effects appears less favorable with the EV measure than with the real GDP 
measure. For the European Union, the same logic applies but with a devaluation—nominal 
income decreases—and lower product prices, which combined provide a net loss with the 
EV measure. By contrast, Brazil appears to gain more with the EV measure relative to the 
real GDP metric. Note that these effects are small relative to the baseline income levels, 
especially for the three reforming OECD countries.   
Our results on the U.S. policy and partial multilateral policy reforms are consistent in 
their directions and magnitudes with those of Elbehri et al. (2000) for comparable scenar-
ios, keeping in mind that Elbehri et al. did not model the Japanese sugar policy and used 
different tariff values, and that their rent-sharing parameters were set differently.2 In our
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analysis, the loss of quota rents has a negative effect on nominal income in the United 
States and accounts for its small accrual of welfare gains following liberalization. However, 
for the European Union we have different results, especially for reforms with tariff reduc-
tions. The differences originate in the assumption regarding out-of-quota imports by the 
European Union. Elbehri et al. include intra-European Union trade in E.U. international 
trade, resulting in the European Union importing above its TRQs, which in reality is not the 
case. The E.U. TRQ expansion has little impact in this context since E.U. imports exceed 
the quota already. Our welfare results also are consistent with Borrell and Pearce.  
The price effects of the reforms indicate that full liberalization would induce sizable 
increases in import and export unit cost for sugar. Given the model structure with differ-
entiated import and export goods, we have different prices for imported sugar and 
exported sugar. The import price for the three QUAD countries would increase by 12 
percent (European Union), 36 percent (the United States), and 11 percent (Japan). The 
export unit price would increase substantially for major exporters, as shown in the last 
column of Table 7. The range of increases is relatively wide, expressing the variation of 
cost structures across countries, and has an average increase of 15 percent for the export-
ers shown in the Table. 
We also ran a homogeneous-good version of the model (see Appendix B for details) 
in order to compute a “true” world price rather than an index of bilateral prices as implied 
by the Armington structure. We ran a full multilateral trade liberalization scenario. This 
exercise leads to a 21 percent increase in the world price of sugar. It is also worth noting 
that welfare gains quadruple with the latter version of the model, reaching $13.6 billion, 
which could be considered an upper bound on welfare gains from liberalizing sugar 
markets.  This exercise also shows how sensitive welfare effects can be to assumptions 
regarding trade structure. Partial equilibrium analyses tend to provide larger price in-
creases (around 30 percent price increase for full trade liberalization) because they 
incorporate short-term supply rigidities and specify raw sugar supply with lower price 
responses than do CGE models (Borell and Pearce 1999; El-Obeid and Beghin 2003; and 
Mitchell 2003).
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Conclusions and Policy Implications 
We used MCP programming to implement TRQs in the global CGE LINKAGE model. 
Then we used this methodological development to analyze TRQ schemes in sugar 
markets in the European Union, the United States, and Japan. The parameterization of the 
Japanese policy is an original aspect of our paper. We looked at reforms of TRQ and 
TRQ-like schemes in these countries, as well as multilateral trade liberalization. We 
found that a 33 percent multilateral decrease of ad valorem tariffs, combined with a 33 
percent increase in imports under TRQ-like schemes in the European Union, the United 
States, and Japan, induces a global welfare gain of about $889 million. But we also found 
that these three countries’ trade policies create substantial trade diversion, excluding most 
low-cost producers from trading opportunities. The current diversion benefits some 
LDCs’ producers because of granted bilateral TRQ allocations. We also found that full 
multilateral trade liberalization induces global welfare gains of about $3 billion. 
Three major policy implications emerge from our analysis. First, market access with 
TRQ expansion in the European Union, the United States, and Japan has a significant 
effect on trade expansion, but it continues the trade diversion intrinsic to the bilateral 
sugar TRQs put in place by the European Union and the United States. Africa clearly 
would benefit from such an export expansion under the E.U. quota expansion. This is less 
true under the multilateral liberalization scenario. Conversely, Brazil fares poorly under 
the TRQ expansions but does much better in the multilateral tariff reduction in terms of 
export market expansion. Hence, there is an issue of transfer and redistribution among 
developing exporters of sugar. Currently the lowest-cost exporters are kept out of the 
E.U. market, which benefits several LDC exporters.   
Second, reforms should consider dramatic cuts in sugar tariffs relative to the quota 
expansion targeted by market access. Relative decreases in out-of-quota tariffs of the 
same order as the quota expansion will have very little or no impact on trade and welfare. 
To have any effect on sugar trade, the tariff (surcharge in Japan) cuts will have to be very 
large and be larger in the United States than in Japan and the European Union. Third and 
last, the Japanese surcharge and state trading have to be brought into the URAA frame-
work, tariffied, and reported to the WTO. It is amazing that Japanese policymakers have 
gotten away with such lack of policy discipline until now. 
  
Appendix A. Implementation of Tariff Rate Quotas in a Global  
Computable General Equilibrium Model 
Global Model 
This appendix shows how to implement TRQs in a global model with TRQs assigned 
on a bilateral basis. 
Equation (A1) represents the bilateral domestic price of imports inclusive of import 
taxes and the quota premium. It is equal to the price of exports produced in region r 
destined for region r’ times the adjustment factors. The in-quota and out-of-quota tariff 
rates are bilaterally specified (as is the quota level), and the quota premium will also be 
bilateral. Nominal national income will depend on how the bilaterally determined quota 
revenues are shared with trading partners. 
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 The same double-nested Armington structure is maintained in the global model. 
Equations (A4)-(A6) describe the top-level CES nest. Equations (A7) and (A8) describe 
the second-level nest where WTF represents the flow from region r’ to region r, i.e., 
exports are read across a row and imports down a column. 
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 Similarly, equations (A9)-(A11) describe the top-level CET nest, and equations 
(A12)-(A14) the second-level CET nest, which determines export supply from market r 
to market r’, with the composite export price (equation (A14)): 
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 Equations (A15) through (A18) correspond to equations (11)-(14) of the original 
model and need no further explanation. They are all simply indexed by region of origin 
and destination. 
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Equation (A19) describes the balance-of-payments equation and as can be derived 
from a combination of the previous equations and therefore represents Walras’s Law. The 
model assumes that the current account is in balance for each region. 
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Appendix B. Homogenous-Good Version of the Model 
This second appendix reports sugar trade liberalization analysis obtained with a ho-
mogenous-commodity version of the LINKAGE model. The LINKAGE model was 
reformulated to accommodate the homogenous commodity assumption in sugar with the 
following major changes. The bilateral trade flows in sugar are replaced by imports from 
and exports to a single world market with a single prevailing world market price. Net 
trade in sugar replaces two-way trade. The policy coverage is represented by ad valorem 
equivalent of the trade distortions as shown in GTAP 5.3, with a modification to remove 
intra-European Union sugar trade. In the European Union, the ad valorem equivalent 
calculation of the trade distortions excludes intra-country trade to provide a better repre-
sentation of the trade barriers faced by the rest of the world exporting to the aggregate 
European Union. Results have illustrative value and represent a long-term impact given 
that price responses are high in the model. The results show that both versions (Arming-
ton, homogeneous-good) of the model provide consistent results on welfare, trade flows, 
and production relocation despite the different treatment of trade and policies.3 The single 
price effect is the distinct feature of the homogeneous-good version of the model.  
Next we report on a full multilateral trade liberalization scenario.  
 
Impact on Production and Consumption 
As expected, the results provide the same directions of changes as the Armington 
version of the model but with sharper contrasts. The full liberalization scenario induces 
the virtual elimination of sugar production in the European Union, Japan, and SACU, and 
the near elimination of the U.S. sugar industry (-94 percent drop). Aggregate world sugar 
output and demand contracts by 1 percent. The final demand component of total sugar 
demand increases by 3 percent with large increases in all formerly protected countries 
(European Union 47 percent, Japan 45 percent, United States 27 percent, and SACU 22 
percent).  
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The world price increases by 21 percent which is close to the increase in the average 
import cost and average export unit value for key countries in the Armington version of 
the model,4 but of course roughly 2.5 times the increase in the average sugar price vari-
able (AWP) reached with the Armington version of the model. These comparisons are 
tenuous since the latter indices are a weighted average of increases in bilateral-trade 
prices. Production increases strongly in Australia (192 percent), Thailand (99 percent), 
and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (200 percent), but less in Brazil. In 
the latter country, the change in producer price is less pronounced because there is a 
border distortion, and the net producer price increase (world price increase net of the 
tariff removal) is moderate. 
Sugar trade expands. The set of countries that expand trade is similar to the one ob-
tained under the Armington version of the model. Formally protected markets exhibit 
higher import flows because the impact of the removal of the distortion net of the world 
price increase is beneficial in these countries. The European Union increases its imports 
by $15 billion, the United States by $4 billion and Japan by $1.6 billion. These figures 
are huge and illustrative of the large trade effects at work. The E.U. trade impact is 
probably larger than what one could realistically expect. Competitive exporters, Austra-
lia, Brazil, the Rest of Latin and Central America, and Thailand, increase their exports by 
$5, $1, $2.1, and $1.9 billion respectively. The comparison of trade flows between the 
two versions of the model is tenuous because we are comparing net and gross trade flows. 
 
Welfare Impact 
The welfare effects are qualitatively unchanged, except for the European Union, 
when compared to the Armington version of the model, although they are much larger in 
aggregate in the homogenous-good model. Aggregate welfare measured by EV increases 
by $13.6 billion. Among exporters, major gains accrue to Australia-New Zealand ($1.5 
billion), Brazil ($0.7 billion), the Rest of Latin and Central America ($1 billion), and 
Thailand ($0.7 billion). Among major importers, the European Union and Japan gain 
from the liberalization ($5.5 and $1 billion respectively), and the United States loses 
(-$1 billion). This contrasting result among importers is explained as follows based on a 
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decomposition of EV into a disposable income component and consumption price 
component.  
The European Union “devalues” (has a lower net factor income) by decreasing factor 
returns to enable large sugar imports (three times the level of U.S. imports) and benefits 
with lower domestic prices (sugar price via liberalization, and other sectors’ prices via 
lower cost). The sum of these two effects (lower income but lower prices) is positive for 
the European Union. Japan “appreciates” because of increased foreign demand for 
manufacturing goods, raising the price of these goods. As a result, Japanese domestic 
prices other than sugar increase, and net income increases as well (appreciation). The 
sum of these effects is positive. The United States sees factor income increase (an appre-
ciation) because of the stronger demand for its manufacturing good exports—Brazil and 
other exporters increase their imports of manufacturing goods. The United States has a 
large service sector, which can absorb higher factor prices and the resulting increase in 
service price. The service sector has a large nontraded component. The net effect of a 
lower sugar price, higher manufacturing prices, and service prices is negative for the 
United States.  
Two asymmetries between the three countries explain their diverging fortunes fol-
lowing sugar trade liberalization. After trade liberalization, the European Union is a much 
larger importer than either the United States or Japan. E.U. domestic production is more 
than twice as large as the U.S. production, and sugar import volume is much larger for 
the European Union than for the United States (3 times) or Japan (nearly 8 times). This 
explains why the European Union experiences a devaluation via lower factor return. The 
United States and Japan have smaller sugar imports but have a different degree of trade 
opening. Japan’s economy is more open and manufacturing-intensive than the U.S. 
economy. This explains why the appreciation is stronger in Japan than in the United 
States, since manufacturing prices cannot rise as much as service prices, which have a 
larger nontraded component. 
The higher world price of sugar plays little role in the economic forces at work, ex-
plaining the welfare effects in these three countries. The stronger the increase in world 
prices, the lower the welfare gains related to the trade liberalization via the sugar domes-
tic price. But the logic of the necessary appreciation/depreciation and resulting 
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decrease/increase in manufacturing and service prices remains unchanged. The treatment 
of sugar as a homogenous commodity (as opposed to an Armington structure) has little 
bearing on the qualitative results. 
In this homogeneous-good version of the model, we also get the discrepancy be-
tween the two welfare measures for the United States (real income at market prices and 
the equivalent variation). The discrepancy results from the different weighting of the 
various price effects and the way price and income effects are aggregated. In the EV 
decomposition, the price effects weighed by consumption expenditure shares are sub-
tracted from the disposable income effect. In the real GDP measure, the numerator 
includes disposable income and trade, which is then deflated by a GDP deflator that 
aggregates the various price changes using weights not identical to expenditure shares. 
We note that in all cases, the aggregate welfare effects are small when expressed in 
percentages of disposable income (of the order of 0.06 percent for the globe).
  
 
 
Endnotes 
1. Canada is not included in the definition of the QUAD used here. 
2. In the latter analysis, the rents from E.U. TRQs accrue entirely to ACP exporters and 
India. For sugar imports from other countries, rents accrue to the European Union. For 
U.S. TRQs, all rents accrue to exporters.  
3. The Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) is the exception. The Armington model 
predicts an expansion of SACU output and trade, whereas the homogeneous commod-
ity model predicts the opposite. 
4. In the Armington version of the model, the import price would increase by 12 percent 
(European Union), 36 percent (United States), and 11 percent (Japan). The export unit 
price would increase substantially for major exporters. The range of increases is rela-
tively wide, expressing the variation of cost structures across countries and with an 
average increase of 15 percent for the key exporters included in the model. 
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